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Dragnet clauses: 
Fischer v First Int’l Bank, 2003 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Boilerplate “dragnet” clause in bank’s trust deed did not, as matter of law, defeat 
borrower’s claim that bank’s other loans to borrower were not cross-collateralized. 
Fischer v First Int’l Bank (2003) 109 CA4th 1433, 1 CR3d 162 
In 1989, the Fischers purchased commercial lots. After obtaining a construction loan from 
First International Bank (FIB), they constructed a large family dining and recreation center on 
the property. In 1998, the Fischers and FIB entered into a written agreement for two additional 
loans: a take-out loan to pay off the existing construction loan (Loan #1) and an equipment loan 
(Loan #2). The loan agreement included the following provision specifying the collateral for 
each of the two loans: 
 Loan #1: First deed of trust on commercial property located at 2102 Main Street, Ramona, 
CA;  
 Loan #2: Second deed of trust on commercial property located at 2102 Main Street, Ramona, 
CA, and second deed of trust on single family residnce located at 14382 Blue Sage Road, 
Poway, CA 
The agreement contained no reference to cross-collatera ization of the loans. The Fischers 
maintained that they “specifically negotiated” the loan agreement so that their residence would 
not be collateral for Loan #1. When the Fischers went to the bank to sign final loan documents, 
including a deed of trust for their residence, they pointed out to the FIB vice-president that the 
proposed deed of trust incorrectly stated that their ome would be collateral for both loans. The 
bank changed the deed of trust so that the definition of the word “note” referred only to Loan #2. 
However, the fine print of the trust deed contained a “dragnet” clause defining indebtedness as 
including “all obligations, debts and liabilities, plus interest thereon, of Borrower to Lender.” 
The deed of trust also included a “due on sale” provisi n giving FIB the right to “declare 
immediately due and payable all sums secured by this Deed of Trust upon the sale or transfer” of 
the residence.  
In 1999, the Fischers decided to sell the residence. A cording to Mrs. Fischer, FIB’s vice-
president told her that if the house were sold, Loan #2 would have to be paid off, but the Fischers 
could retain any excess proceeds from the sale. In reliance on that representation and on their 
own understanding of the loan agreement, the Fischer  sold their home. After Loan #2 was paid 
off through escrow, $125,000 remained. FIB demanded that the $125,000 be applied to Loan #1 
and the escrow company issued a check to FIB for $125,000. FIB returned $25,000 to the 
Fischers. The Fischers sued FIB for breach of contract and various tort-based causes. The trial 
court granted FIB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the definition of “indebtedness” 
in the trust deed gave FIB the right to apply the funds from the sale of the residence to the 
balance of both loans. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the 
parties had agreed to cross-collateralization of the loans. The court rejected the argument that, as 
a matter of law, the dragnet clause defeated the Fischers’ suit. The court pointed out that, 
although California courts have upheld the general validity of dragnet clauses, they have also 
recognized that those clauses can enwrap an unsuspecting debtor in an arrangement that he or 
she did not contemplate. Given that a dragnet clause in a trust deed is an adhesion contract that 
should be narrowly construed against the lender, California courts have consistently adhered to a 
construction of such clauses that depends more on the actual expectations of the parties than on 
the literal wording of the boilerplate. The courts have considered factors such as the language 
and specificity of the dragnet clause; whether the parties were aware of the dragnet clause and 
appreciated its significance; whether the other loans were of the same type or character as the 
primary loan; and whether the bank relied on the dragnet clause as the security for the other 
loans. Applying those general principles, the court did not find an objectively clear and 
unambiguous expression of mutual intent to cross-collateralize the loans, and held that the 
conflicting provisions of the loan agreement and the deed of trust created a triable issue of fact 
regarding the true intentions of the parties.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Sometimes lenders just cannot resist shooting themselves in their 
feet. Like those who make full-credit bids at their own foreclosure sales, some also seem 
unable to stop including in their deeds of trust the same clauses that got them into so much 
trouble earlier. 
Back in 1979, in the first edition of my California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice 
(Cal CEB 1979), I wrote, “creditors will not solve their problems by writing increasingly 
broad dragnet clauses, but rather by tending toward more specificity in describing 
subsequent obligations to be included.” (The other obligation in this case was 
contemporaneous rather than subsequent, but the lesson is the same.)  
When lenders woke up to that problem, they eliminated the language under which the 
deed of trust secured any and every obligation anybod  could think of, and replaced it with 
new phrasing under which it secured only notes specifically referenced. But now comes 
Fischer v First Int’l Bank (2003) 109 CA4th 1433, 1 CR3d 162, and, in wanting o have it 
both ways, the lender forgot the original lesson. Its securing clause refers only to one 
particular note, but then adds “the indebtedness,” and defines that as including everything 
under the sun. Well, if a lender can get into trouble for making its security provision too 
broad, it’s not going to escape that trouble by moving the broadness over to the definition 
provision instead. 
However, this arrangement was ambiguous, given that the loan agreement stated that the 
other loan was not covered and the deed of trust said th t it was. That means that parol 
evidence will come in to explain it, and that means that the borrower’s interpretation is sure 
to prevail. If these borrowers say that they did not i tend to have their home secure the real 
estate loan, there is more than enough in the loan documents alone to support that 
interpretation.  
The bank was lucky here: It merely lost its claim that the security covered both the real 
estate loan and the equipment loan, although it mayend up having to pay damages for 
having taken that position. It could have been worse: Once a loan document is ambiguous, 
borrowers can probably have it construed either way,  whichever is best for them. In a 
different setting, for instance, the bank might lose it  claim entirely if the borrowers claimed 
that the mortgage also secured their other loan and the bank violated the one-action rule by 
unilaterally releasing its security for that loan!  
Cross-collateralization is a powerful tool, but in California it can blow up in a lender’s 
face. Lenders and their lawyers should be far more cautious about using it. —Roger 
Bernhardt 
 
